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A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called 
“sensitive” zones where the Syrian war threatens to spread into Lebanon. While the 
Syrian army withdrew from North Lebanon in April 2005, Tripoli’s destiny 
remained intrinsically linked to Syria. This was because of the numerous historical, 
political, family, and economic ties linking the social space of north Lebanon to its 
Syrian hinterland. The demographic composition of the city resembles Syria. 
Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9%) and includes, in addition 
to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (8,9 %, 
or 28,525 persons) 1 . This paper analyses the consequences of the Syrian 
intervention and presence in Lebanon on political leadership in Tripoli. It shows 
how the Syrian presence created alliances, conflicts and divisions still present in 
Tripoli today. The main argument is that the Syrian presence in Tripoli de-
structured Sunni leadership in North Lebanon. New Syrian political-economic 
networks emerged, where clients were awarded with political and economic 
influence. Common interests between Tripolitanian businessmen and actors in the 
Syrian military developed during the period of the Syrian presence. Tripoli’s 
political field became more split, between winners and losers of the Syrian 
presence. The losers of the Syrian period included in particular the urban poor, who 
suffered from Syrian repression and from competition from Syrian labourers. This 
led to the disintegration of internal solidarity within Tripoli’s political field, until 
then known for its unity around anti-imperialist and Sunni Islamic norms. Tripoli’s 
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Sunnism had, at least since the struggle against French mandate in the 1920s and 
1930s, constituted one sole actor on the Lebanese scene, calling for Muslim rights 
and re-allocation of state resources to peripheral areas and affirming Lebanon’s 
Arab identity. Rashid Karami, who served as Prime Minister during long periods in 
the Shehabist period, gained large electoral majorities in Tripoli in the 1960s and 
redistributed state resources to Tripolitanians. Karami had a very good working 
relationship with Syria. After 1967, the political scene in Tripoli was fragmented 
between Karami and movements of the Arab nationalist left, including Iraqi 
Ba‘athism and Arafat’s Fatah. The Syrian intervention consolidated and 
accentuated the split in the Sunni population in Tripoli. 
 This chapter first addresses the research literature on the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon and outlines the general background information on Syrian, involvement, 
in particular the motives and interests for the Syrian intervention to Lebanon in 
1976. Secondly, it analyses the transformation within Tripoli’s field of politics 
before, during and following the Syrian intervention (1976). Finally, three 
hypotheses to account for the Syrian determination to control Tripoli and its 
hinterland are considered. The first centres on Tripoli’s Islamists, the second on 
communal motivations, and the third on economic and material gains. 
 
Existing literature  
Despite the insightful lessons North Lebanon can bring to the study of Syro-
Lebanese relations, the region is notoriously understudied. Few in-depth studies 
exist in English or French. The Arabic-language literature on Syrian policies in 
North Lebanon are somewhat more extensive but not until recently. A key problem 
has been the difficulty for foreign scholars to gain access to good primary sources 
in the heavily Syrian-controlled region. The most published scholar on North 
Lebanon, the late Michel Seurat, was abducted in 1985.2 During 1993-2005 period, 
the Lebanese press was subject to heavy restrictions, which made it virtually 
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impossible for sociologists to analyze political dynamics in North Lebanon in any 
significant detail.3  
 This changed in 2005, after Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. A number of 
Tripolitanian political actors, journalists, and sociologists lifted the veil on the issue 
and published books and a series of articles in the Lebanese press4 about their 
experiences between 1986 and 2005. The main focus was on the Syrian regime’s 
repression of Sunni Islamist movements5 and on the relationship between local 
notables and Syria.6 Although, much of the material was written by actors; not 
observers, and therefore may suffer from inaccuracies and political bias,7 it can be 
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complemented with other issue-specific material, on the modes of intervention in 
the Tripoli’s parliamentary elections,8 Tripoli’s municipality,9 social conditions,10 
rural dynamics in Akkar,11 and the compliance with Human Rights.12  
 The written material is complemented with fieldwork research carried out 
during a six-year period in North Lebanon (2008-2013). The author met with 
politicians, religious shaykhs, grassroots activists, university professors, and 
journalists, from all sides of the political spectrum.13 Because confidence was built 
up with the informants over time, revealing, hitherto unknown, anecdotes and more 
precise information were obtained. Triangulating the different sources, the present 
study attempts to describe, in the most empirical and nuanced manner possible, 
Syrian practices in North Lebanon, and to put it into context with the general 
political practices during Pax Syriana.  
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The Syrian presence in North Lebanon 
Syrian troops, which at most numbered 40,000, first entered Lebanon on June 1st 
1976 during the first round of the Lebanese civil war to crush the momentum of the 
Palestinian-Islamo-Progressive alliance.14 It was mandated as an Arab Defence 
Force (ADF) in October 1976.15 The non-Syrian elements of the ADF were 
withdrawn during the spring of 1979, while Syrian forces remained in Lebanon 
until April 2005. 
 After initially intervening at the request of the Christian conservatives, Syria 
reknitted ties with the PLO, the Lebanese left, Iraq, and Jordan after Sadat’s travel 
to Jerusalem in November 1977. The marriage of convenience between Syria and 
the PLO ended after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and turned into outright 
war in Tripoli in the autumn of 1983. Syria’s strategy in Lebanon was nonetheless 
consistent in the sense that it at all times aimed to impede either of the conflicting 
parties in the Lebanese war from conclusively defeating the other.16  
 
Motives for the Syrian presence in the existing literature  
Much has been written about the possible Syrian motives for its paradoxical 
intervention in Lebanon, to contain the PLO and National Movement. Five motives 
identified in the literature are detailed below: 
• Geopolitics: Lebanon is a buffer protecting Damascus and Syrian industrial 
centres against any potential Israeli offensive through the Beqa‘a. 17  The 
intervention into Lebanon occurred in a context when a victory of the National 
Movement was impending and Syrian decision makers feared that the Lebanese 
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state could disintegrate. 18  This caused Syrian alarm because a defeat of the 
Lebanese Christian-conservatives could lead to an Israeli intervention into Lebanon 
and/or a break-up of the country into confessional enclaves, and a defeated 
Christian community might have an incentive to strike an alliance with Israel. After 
the Egyptian-Israeli bilateral peace, Lebanon became a card against which to swap 
the Golan Heights. Damascus wanted to ensure Washington and Israel that there 
could be no durable peace without Syria.19  
• Patronising the Palestinians. After 1973, Syria understood it was bound to lose 
another conventional war with Israel and wanted at any price to avoid being 
dragged into armed confrontation. Moreover, the Asad regime perceived the PLO’s 
growing recognition and autonomy as a great threat. In 1974, the PLO gained 
observer status in the UN General Assembly and, during a summit of Arab state 
leaders in Rabat, it was declared the “sole representative of the Palestinian 
people”.20 For Asad, who insisted his country was the cradle of Pan-Arabism, 
control over the Palestinian cause was an invaluable source of internal and regional 
legitimacy. It was an essential card to use against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and 
internal political enemies.21  
• Ideology: Since the Islamic conquest of Damascus in 636, Syria was thecentre 
of Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria), which included Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and 
parts of Turkey. The redrawing of international borders by the British and French 
in 1920 and the loss of Lebanon were great traumas for Syrian Arab nationalists. 
Lebanon and Syria were perceived as constituting one indivisible nation.22 Dawisha 
argues that this belief was fundamental in shaping Syrian policies towards 
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Lebanon.23 It helped legitimise the intervention in some segments of the domestic 
public opinion and amongst Syrian policy makers. Pan-Syrianism does, however, 
not suffice to account for the timing of the intervention in 1976.24 Pan-Syrianism 
was not the only reason why Syria intervened in Lebanon, but a complementary 
explanatory variable. When, in spring 1976, the Asad regime finally decided to 
intervene in Lebanon, it was for the pursuit of more tangible strategic gains, 
essential for regime survival. 
•    Regime survival: Lebanon was central to the debate on Syrian internal stability 
because of its role, since 1949, as a centre of conspiracy and subversion, from 
which coups d’État occurring in Damascus were planned.25 Since 1970, a growing 
part of Syrian society had protested against the usurpation of power by a military 
clique hailing from rural, minority backgrounds. In February 1973, protests erupted 
against the new constitution, which omitted the article of former Syrian 
constitutions requiring that the president had to be a (Sunni) Muslim. 26  
• Political economy: Despite economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, Syria 
suffered from a widening balance of payment gap already in 1976.27 The outbreak 
of the Lebanese civil war had hampered the accessibility of capital, on which 
Syrian heavy industries depended.28 Some scholars therefore argue that Syria 
intervened in Lebanon in order to extract the needed resources, from the Lebanese 
banking system, the port of Beirut and cheap Lebanese manufactures, to prevent 
the escalation of a social conflict at home.29 It is pertinent to point to the economic 
gains actors in the Syrian regime made in Lebanon (see below), but there is not a 
solid enough empirical data to demonstrate that domestic protests in Syria took off 
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28 Lawson, « The Syrian intervention » p. 469. 
29 Lawson, « The Syrian intervention » pp. 473-475. 




prior to the intervention into Lebanon.30 The tipping point for the unrest seems to 
have been immediately following the intervention, when tens of thousands of 
Syrians took to the streets against the crushing of the Lebanese National Movement 
and the PLO in Lebanon.31 This led to the arrest of several hundred people in Syria, 
mainly communists.32 The presence in Lebanon was moreover a financial burden 
on Syria in the early phase.33  
 The intervention of Syrian troops into Lebanon is therefore best explained 
using a realist paradigm: a consolidated and unitary state seeking to protect its 
security in the face of external aggression. This did not exclude the fact that Syria 
also benefited from the intervention into Lebanon to quell domestic political 
enemies, in particular in Tripoli. However, over time, once Syria consolidated its 
influence in Lebanon, economic interests and concerns related to Syria’s domestic 
politics became more important. This was especially so after 1983, when Syria’s 
economy began to suffer from a serious decline and budget deficits.34  
 Although a set of defined long-term foreign policy objectives existed, the 
Syrian regime operated without a general plan and grasped opportunities as they 
arose.35 The departure of the PLO from Lebanon (1983) extended Syria’s margins 
of manoeuvre. The deepening of the alliance with Iran by the mid-1980s and 
Syria’s isolation from the Arab world during the Iran-Iraq war also helped modify 
the stakes within Lebanon.  
 The Syrian continuing role in Lebanon after the end of the civil war was 
enshrined by the Ta’if accords (October 1989), which formally ended the war in 
Lebanon.36 The accords provided that the Syrian forces would assist the Lebanese 
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government in restoring sovereignty throughout the country. Two years after the 
ratification of the accord, they were to redeploy to the Beqa‘a. Further 
redeployments would be decided later by a Lebanese and Syrian military 
committee. Bilateral treaties, such as the May 1991, Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination Treaty, gave further legal grounds for the Syrian presence. This 
“Syrian peace” was accepted by the Bush administration, partly because it was 
considered better than the alternative of anarchy from the Lebanese civil war, 
partly because Hafiz al-Asad’s regime was already in 1989 seen as a potential 
source of support against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  
 
The roots of the conflict between Tripoli’s Sunnis and the Asad regime 
Muslim elites in Lebanon and Syria respectively had, ever since the 1930s, 
somewhat uneasy relations.37  These emerged out of conflicting interests, not 
religion. Since Lebanon lacked Arab nationalist credentials and Syria saw itself as 
the cradle of Pan-Arabism, Syrian notables felt entitled to give ideological 
guidance to the Arab nationalist movement in Lebanon. 38  Lebanese Arab 
nationalists resented this intervention in their affairs. They also denounced Syrian 
Arab nationalist governments’ use of food blockage vis-à-vis Lebanon as an 
instrument to solve economic differences.39 They saw Gamal Abdel-Nasser, not the 
Syrian Ba‘ath party, as being entitled to lead the Arab Umma. When, at the break-
up of the United Arab Republic in 1961, many of Tripoli’s Muslims sided with 
Abdel-Nasser, 40 Syrian notables were annoyed.41 In the 1970s, urban poor Sunnis 
in Tripoli gave strong support to all of the Asad regime’s regional enemies: Fatah, 
the Iraqi Ba‘ath party and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. This support may be 
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interpreted in light of the increasingly conflictual relationship between Sunnis in 
North Lebanon and Syria. 
 Until the late 1960s, Alawis in Tripoli had formed part of the same social space 
and political masses as the Sunni Muslims. The politicisation of Alawi identity in 
North Lebanon began in the 1970s. While Sunni Muslims and many Christians in 
Tripoli in the late 1960s adhered to New Left parties and movements close to 
Yasser Arafat, Alawis in Tripoli increasingly began to see Hafiz al-Asad as a 
model. 
 
Salah Jadid’s regime and the peasant movement in Akkar 
Syria began to increasingly meddle in domestic policies in North Lebanon after 
Salah Jadid’s takeover in 1966. The main Syrian entryway was in this early period 
through the peasant movements in Akkar. The protesters could be identified not 
only in terms of their class but also by their sect: the great majority of the 
protesting agricultural labourers in the plains of Akkar were Alawis, while the 
landlords were Sunnis.  
 The first Alawi families in Lebanon emigrated in search for work from the 
impoverished Jabal Ansariyah in Syria starting from the end of the 19th century. 42 
The emigration was accentuated during the years of economic boom (1950 et 1960) 
and, more intensely, during the period of the Syrian tutelage. Many were seasonal 
labourers, who travelled back and forth from Syria.  
 The two main protest leaders included Khaled Saghieh, a Greek-Orthodox 
Ba‘athist lawyer who had studied in Damascus, and Mohamed Ba‘arini, a Sunni 
tribal chieftain. Saghieh was a pragmatist close to the Ba‘ath party.43 He was 
guided by some general beliefs on Arab nationalism and rights of peasants, but did 
not develop a sophisticated ideology. His leadership recalled that of Akram 
Hourani in the Hama region. As a permanent candidate for the legislative elections 
since 1964, Saghieh wooed the Alawi community, which he hoped could adopt him 
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as their representative, given that Alawis had no parliamentary representation in 
Lebanon before Ta’ef. Ba‘arini hailed from Fneideq, a perfect example of what 
Michael Gilsenan called the “Lebanese marches”.44 Here, men worked in the 
Lebanese army or gained a living from smuggling. Having relations with Syria was 
primordial for the population to survive. Ba‘athist Arab nationalism was popular 
amongst the peasants.  
 In March 1973, after an assassination attempt targeting landlord leader Sleiman 
al-Ali’s brother, Malik, Khaled Saghieh and Ba‘arini escaped to Syria. Saghieh 
returned in early 1973. He was shot shortly afterwards and died three months later 
from his wounds.45 Mohamed Ba‘arini stayed in exile in Homs, and was de facto 
pardoned in 1976, after the Syrian entry to Lebanon. The peasant revolts ended 
because of the war. Ba‘arini became one of Syria’s main allies in Lebanon. His son, 
Wajih Ba‘arini, took over his leadership, and accumulated personal wealth through 
smuggling. When candidates were appointed to the legislature to replace deceased 
MPs and fill new seats, Wajih Ba’arini was appointed from Akkar to replace the 
late Sleiman al-Ali.  
 It may be hypothesised that the peasant revolts were instigated by the Syrian 
regime to gain leeway in North Lebanon, and later, continued under Asad, once it 
started to prepare for a larger-scale military entry into Lebanon. The fact that 
regular New Left parties failed in their mobilisation attempts in Akkar strengthens 
this argument. When the Organisation for Communist Action in Lebanon (OACL), 
as well as a few Maoist parties, also tried to mobilise peasants, 46 they received a 
warmer welcome in Sunni villages than in Alawi villages. 47 If Alawi peasants 
identified with Saghieh, it was because he was close to the Syrian line.48  
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 The growing support for the peasant movements was perceived by Sunni 
landlords as a communal mobilisation and made them look towards the state to 
protect them from bands of Alawi peasants armed by Damascus. Sunni peasants 
found support among Palestinians in Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi, and began to 
mobilise in favour of the Palestinian resistance, which, at certain points, would 
have put them in opposition to Syria’s strategy in Lebanon. Similar polarisations 
between Alawis and Sunnis in Tripoli began in Tripoli a few years later. 
 
The rise of Ali Eid and the Alawi Youth Movement 
The Alawis in Tripoli numbered approximately 20,000.49 They were poor, and 
most settled in Bab al-Tebbaneh, the most affordable area. Most lived on the upper 
side, called Jabal Drawish or Jabal Mohsen. Like other residents in Bab al-
Tebbaneh, Alawis worked at the vegetable market, the wheat souq, the factories in 
Bahsas or at the port in al-Mina.50  
 Alawis and Sunnis in Bab al-Tebbaneh belonged to the same social strata and 
until the early 1970s, were part of the same political realm as the Sunnis in Tripoli. 
Alawis were often business associates with Sunnis, and intermarriages were 
relatively common.51 Class was initially the driving force behind political action in 
Tebbaneh.52 However, when it came to obtaining official positions within the state, 
Alawis had to convert to Sunnism to have the chance to hold an official function. 
In the late 1960s, with the consolidation of the Alawi in power in Damascus, 
Lebanese Alawis began to look to Syria for political support.53 Some adhered to 
pro-Syrian political groups, such as the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Ba‘ath 
Party.  
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 In 1972, a group of Alawi young professionals created a movement 
campaigning for political rights for Lebanese Alawis, the Alawi Youth Movement 
(harakat al-shabiba al-alawiyya). 54  Its two main claims were Alawi representation 
in parliament (at least one seat) and naturalisation of 20,000 Alawi workers who 
had migrated from Syria.55 Ali Eid, an Alawi from Jabal Mohsen, soon became 
President of the society. Eid’s grandfather had emigrated from Syria and opened a 
large shop in Tripoli’s wheat souq. Eid travelled to the US to study, married an 
American woman and had a daughter, but was expelled the same year because he 
committed a crime.56 He returned to Lebanon and studied political science at the 
AUB. He claimed to have been inspired by US civil rights movements, and 
considered the Alawis in Lebanon to be in a position similar to the blacks in the 
US.57  
 In 1972, Ali Eid was stabbed with a knife in the back by a Saudi prince, during 
a night out, and hospitalised.58 Eid was close to President Sleiman Frangié, who 
arranged for Prime Minister Sa’ib Salam to strike a deal between Eid and the Saudi 
prince according to which the prince paid a large sum of money to Ali Eid to get 
his agreement to withdraw charges.59 Eid consolidated his ties with the Salam and 
Frangié families and became close to Frangié’s son, Tony. The latter supplied Eid 
with weapons, which originated from Syria.60 Salam and Frangié sought to split 
Tripoli’s political scene and weaken Rashid Karami, their political enemy.61 
Frangié also introduced Aid to the Asads. It cannot be ruled out that the patronage 
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of the Frangié family for Eid, constituted an exchange of service, after Frangié had 
received help of various types from Syria in the late 1950s onwards.62 
 With the financial power of Ali Eid, the Alawi Youth Movement soon became 
a tool for the Eid family to control the Alawi community in Tripoli. Eid put his own 
family in all its positions.63 Moreover, Sa’ib Salam, Prime Minister and Interior 
Minister, who had given it official authorisation, came to Tripoli and celebrated the 
official launch of the society. 
 
Musa al-Sadr, the Asad regime, and Tripoli 
From initially being close to Frangié, Ali Eid soon developed contacts with the 
Syrian regime. This occurred after Eid organised large protests against Shi‘i cleric 
Musa Sadr, the Chairman of Lebanon's Supreme Islamic Shiite Council (SISC). 
Eid’s opposed Sadr’s ambition to put the personal status codes of the Lebanese 
Alawi community under the jurisdiction of the SISC. In 1973, Sadr issued a fatwa 
that Alawism was a part of Shi‘i Islam. Although Lebanese Alawis were de jure 
under the jurisdiction of the Sunni-dominated Supreme Islamic Shari‘a Council, the 
sect had de facto obtained autonomy in internal affairs under the French. Since they 
were part of the same tribes as the Syrian Alawis, they referred to Alawi religious 
shaykhs in Syria on important communal matters.  
 Alawi traditional tribal and religious shaykhs in Syria proper were initially 
reluctant to give Sadr jurisdiction over Lebanon’s Alawis,64 but priorities changed 
in early 1973, after Sunni protests swept through Syrian cities against Hafiz al-
Asad’s assumption of the presidency, the first non-Sunni to hold the post. The 
Syrian President needed an external authority, preferably a Twelver Shi‘i cleric, to 
boost his regime’s Islamic credentials. During a public ceremony in July 1973 in 
Tripoli, al-Sadr, in his official function as chairman of the SISC, appointed a 
Lebanese Alawi to the position of Twelver Mufti of Tripoli and Northern Lebanon. 
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A delegation of Syrian Alawi religious shaykhs endorsed the move with their 
presence.  
 The Alawi Youth Movement opposed al-Sadr, arguing that Alawis should gain 
separate legal recognition, independent of the Twelver Shi‘is. The society 
mobilised in the days before al-Sadr’s arrival in Tripoli. Tensions in the streets of 
Tripoli ran high, and roadblocks were set up.65 Rifa‘at al-Asad visited Tripoli to 
mediate and convinced Eid that Syrian patronage would protect the Alawis in 
Lebanon. 66 Al-Sadr was obliged to issue a “clarification” in which he declared that 
SISC’s aim had been not to absorb the Alawis into the Ja‘afari sect but to provide 
them with “a service they lacked”, that is, communal tribunals.67  
 Rifa‘at al-Asad had been recommended to Eid by Tony Frangié, son of 
President Sleiman Frangié and a close personal friend of Rifa‘at’s. Eid soon gained 
strong support from Rifa‘at and Jamil al-Asad, who were developing the Ali 
Murtada organisation in Syria against the Muslim Brotherhood.68 Rifa‘at sent one 
of his three sons, Ribal, to Tripoli to help his ally.69 Eid gained access to important 
funds, which enabled him to expand his clientele in Jabal Mohsen. By 1976, Eid 
had become the symbol of the Syrian regime in Tripoli. He married a Syrian Alawi 
from Safita, and travelled regularly to Tartus.70 When he had a son in 1977, he 
named him, coincidentally or not, Rifa‘at. When Syria turned against the 
Palestinians in the spring of 1976, Eid remained a Syrian protégée. The Syrian 
intervention led to a worsening of the Alawi-Sunni conflict. While all other 
political parties were banned, Eid was given large concessions and developed his 
presence in Tripoli. 
 
 
                                                
65 Kramer, Shi‘ism, Resistance, and Revolution, pp. 246, 248. 
66 Interview, Badr Wannous, Tripoli, June 2012. 
67 Kramer, Shi‘ism, Resistance, and Revolution, p. 246. 
68 Interview, Badr Wannous, Tripoli, June 2012; Seurat, L’État de barbarie, p. 138. 
69 Interview, Ignace Leverrier, Paris, October 2013. 
70 Interview, Badr Wannous, Tripoli, June 2012. 




Strains in the Palestino-Syrian relations: North Lebanon as an example 
During an offensive in April 1976, prior to the June Syrian intervention, the 
Palestinian-Progressive coalition 71 forces in Tripoli struck Jabal Mohsen and 
destroyed several houses, including Eid’s.72 This forced many of Tripoli’s Alawis 
to leave Jabal Mohsen and abandon their houses, and many went to Syria. 73 The 
strike targeted Eid because he allied with Syria, and also occurred in a context of 
strikes against Syrian allies, Sa‘iqa and PFLP-GC,74 but was framed by Eid as an 
attack against the Alawis as a community.  
 Eid used the event as a casus belli and began to argue that the Alawis needed to 
protect themselves militarily. Alawis became increasingly fearful for their  
existence in Tripoli, and many began to leave other areas in Tripoli to settle in 
Jabal Mohsen, which became a sectarian sanctuary.75 The attack also worsened 
relations between Sunnis in Bab al-Tebbaneh and Alawis in Jabal Mohsen, since 
men from Tebbaneh supported Fatah in the attack.76  
 
The impact of the Syrian intervention on Sunni militancy in Tripoli 
Rashid Karami and other Sunni institutional leaders welcomed the entry in June 
1976 of the Syrian army to Lebanon to re-stabilise Lebanon. Karami developed 
close bonds to Syria. The same was true for many of Tripoli’s merchants and 
notables, who developed friendships and close economic and political bonds to 
officers of the Syrian army. Tripoli’s left-wing parties, on the other hand, opposed 
the entry of the Syrian army into Lebanon as a bid to crush PLO. The Syrian army 
outlawed all political parties, with the exception of the SSNP. All the left-wing 
parties, including the 24 October movement, the strongest local militia, decided to 
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withdraw without a battle. 77 The PLO left Tripoli and settled its forces in the 
nearby Palestinian camps, Beddawi and Nahr al-Bared. Other activists stopped 
their activities and went underground. 
 The Iraqi Ba‘ath party became one of the heaviest Syrian targets in 1978. 
Ghassan Salamé wrote in 1991 that Syria in its regional policy was driven more by 
the rivalry with Iraq than by Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause.78 The 
Tripoli case shows that, although the overall cause for the Syrian intervention into 
Lebanon was to avoid breakdown of the Lebanese state and thus a direct 
confrontation with Israel, Syria’s entry into Lebanon assisted it in crushing its own 
geopolitical enemies. An illustration of the Asad regime’s sectarian policies in 
Tripoli was that unlike Abd al-Majid al-Rafa‘i, the Sunni head of the Lebanese 
branch of the Iraqi Ba’th, whose house was destroyed and who was forced into 
exile,79 Dr. Khodr, an Alawi cadre of the Iraqi Ba‘ath party in Tripoli, was not 
arrested or targeted, but co-opted and moved to Jabal Mohsen 80  
 Jund Allah, the largest Islamist militia in Tripoli at the time, took pains to 
appease Syria. The group stopped all activity between the entry of Syrian troops in 
1976 and until 1978.81 In 1978, Jund Allah leader Fawaz Agha was arrested by the 
Syrian intelligence and held for 40 days. When released, he was forced to give up 
his weapons and cease his political activities. This event coincided with the Israeli 
occupation of South Lebanon, and Jund Allah was allowed to send combatants to 
defend the south. 82 This helped Jund Allah gain new legitimacy, access to centres 
of military training in the south, and contacts with Fatah, which began to send 
weapons and money.83 By 1979 Jund Allah had become a well-developed group, 
with military activities in South Lebanon, religious training, a dispensary and a 
sports club. Although the PLO formally realigned with Syria in 1979, Jund Allah 
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began to oppose Syria. 84 The opposition became more and more pronounced, and 
in 1981, Jund Allah had gained enough strength to expel the Syrians from their 
positions in Abi Samra. 
 
The Creation of the Arab Democratic Party 
The entry of the Syrian-dominated ADF facilitated the penetration of a strong 
contingent of Syrian intelligence agents in Lebanon. In Tripoli, it took the 
Communist Action Organizatin’s former office at the American School in Jabal 
Mohsen as its headquarters. From the Syrian side, protecting the Alawis was 
subordinate to the fact that85 Jabal Mohsen was a strategic place on a hill and at a 
distance from the Lebanese army HQ in Qubbeh. Moreover, because Alawis had 
left their houses subsequent to the attack on Jabal Mohsen, there were many vacant 
houses. Syrian forces moved in to control these areas. The choice of Jabal Mohsen 
was perceived by many Tripolitanians as a sign that the Syrian regime was 
pursuing a sectarian policy in Lebanon.86 Eid returned to Tripoli with the Syrian 
forces, and rebuilt his house where it had been, as a challenge to his political 
enemies.87 The Arab Youth Movement in Jabal Mohsen developed into a militia, 
the Red Knights, under Syrian control.  
 In June 1981, Eid and certain other Syrian allies created the Arab Democratic 
Party (ADP).88 The party had no obvious Alawi appearance. Nassib al-Khatib, the 
Sunni lawyer from South Lebanon, was elected President, and Rashed al-
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Muqaddem, a Sunni from Tripoli, became Secretary-General.89 Yet, de facto power 
within the ADP lay with Eid and his patron, Rifa‘at al-Asad. ADP’s Alawi 
character became more avowed in 1985, when al-Khatib was replaced with Eid. 
Al-Khatib was assassinated the following year. 
 
Proxy battle between Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen (1979-1982) 
Bab al-Tebbaneh was one of the few areas in Tripoli where the Syrian army was 
not immediately heavily deployed. The strength of the Popular Resistance, a local 
social and military group, led by a young local charismatic leader, Khalil Akkawi, 
hindered the Syrian troops’ entry there.90 Yet, growing pressure from Syrian 
intelligence centred in Jabal Mohsen forced the group to demobilise.91 A wave of 
arrests began, and some activists were found assassinated. Akkawi went into hiding 
in Beddawi under the PLO’s protection.92  Those, who remained in Bab al-
Tebbaneh stopped their activities, for fear of arrest and assassination.  
 Despite the end of open fighting, relations between pro-Syrian and Fatah-
affiliated Palestinian groups remained tense. Kidnappings and assassinations 
targeted prominent communist, Iraqi Ba‘athist and Popular Resistance leaders.93 
The civilian population suffered from siege and electricity- and water cuts. 
Barricades were set up in the poor quarters. People in Tebbaneh were threatened by 
snipers located in Jabal Mohsen, and many were arrested or attacked by the Syrian 
forces. The situation led to a growing anti-Syrian climate. The leader of the new 
anti-Syrian mobilisation was Sa‘id Sh‘aban, an Islamic religious preacher and 
former member of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (JI), the Lebanese branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. He became increasingly popular because of his violent denunciations 
of the Syrian presence. Resentment was directed against Eid. With the help of the 
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Syrian intelligence, Eid took control of state infrastructure in Tripoli and important 
sources of material wealth. Arafat-sympathisers in Bab al-Tebbaneh increasingly 
began to see him as a puppet of the Syrian intelligence machine. The rise of Jabal 
Mohsen as an Alawi communal ghetto worried people in Tripoli, who also felt that 
the Syrian army was partisan in local conflicts and that its presence tilted the 
internal balances of power in Tripoli.94 
 The first instance of heavy fighting between Arafat-supporters in Bab al-
Tebbaneh and Alawis in Jabal Mohsen broke out in the spring of 1979, following 
the withdrawal of the last non-Syrian contingents from the ADF. Many Sunni 
movements, including Jund Allah supported the Popular Resistance. Syria was 
involved in the confrontation yet officially insisted that it was doing nothing other 
than carrying out its mandate from the Arab countries, i.e., to separate between 
fighting forces, repress militias, and end the civil war”.95   
 The Popular Resistance fought against what it perceived to be a Syrian 
occupation, and defended what it saw as the integrity, honour and collective 
memory of Tripoli as a “combative city state”.96 The fighting between Eid’s group 
and the Popular Resistance initially occurred in spite of, and not because of, 
alliances at the regional level. 97  Despite the rapprochement which occurred 
between Fatah and Syria against Egypt in late 1977 (see above), Hafiz al-Asad and 
Fatah chairman Yasser Arafat were never allies. They competed for the control 
over the Palestinian cause. Arafat pursued a double strategy vis-à-vis Syria. He 
granted concessions to Asad but maintained relations with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and Sadat’s Egypt.98 Syria accused Arafat of hindering a common Arab front 
against Egypt, and being fooled by the US administration and gave full backing to 
Arafat’s rivals within the PLO. With the late 1970s outbreak of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood insurgency in Syria, Asad also accused Arafat of sheltering fugitive 
Brotherhood fighters in the Palestinian camps in North Lebanon.99  
 Tripoli became a microcosm of the Syrian-Palestinian rivalry. The city was a 
confined social space, where damaging ripple effects of local battles could be 
managed relatively easily. Thus, Asad and Arafat were partners at the regional and 
national Lebanese level, but in Tripoli Fatah backed the Popular Resistance 
movement, while the Syrian regime continued to prop up Ali Eid. 100  Fighting 
between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tebbaneh escalated in July 1981, and 
intermittent heavy clashes and car bombs caused over a hundred casualties during 
the year preceding the Israeli 1982 invasion. 
 As the Syrian regime and Arafat both invested politically in Tripoli, Bab al-
Tebbaneh’s struggle increasingly became part of the broader regional conflict.101 
The conflict was at the time not sectarian. One of the Popular Resistance field 
commanders, Samir al-Hassan, was Alawi and fought alongside Akkawi against 
Eid. 102 The front line of Syria Street, which divided the two quarters, was used by 
external actors as a means to send messages, and the dynamics were understood as 
such. 103  
 
Syrian motivations in North Lebanon 
In this section, three hypotheses on the Asad regime’s motivations in North 
Lebanon will be tested. First, it will be argued that Syria considered North Lebanon 
a high risk-area because of the rise of Islamist movements in Tripoli after 1982. 
Second, it will be asked whether the Asad regime had a specific antipathy towards 
Sunni Muslims, which made it seek alliances to counter the influence of Sunni 
leaders. Thirdly, it will be argued that North Lebanon became a centre of a Syrian-
dominated informal economy.  
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The Syrian opposition to the Tawhid movement 
In September 1982, in the wake of the Israeli invasion and the PLO evacuation 
from Beirut a new Islamist militia, the Islamic Tawhid movement (Harakat al-
Tawhid al-Islami), emerged in Tripoli. The movement was created by the 
unification of three movements: the Popular Resistance, Esmat Mrad’s Arab 
Lebanon movement, and shaykh Sa‘id Sh‘aban and his supporters. The Popular 
Resistance and the Arab Lebanon Movement were Maoist movements close to 
Fatah, in particular to Fatah’s Student Squad. Both Akkawi and Mrad had recently 
turned towards Islam, as a means to become closer to the ideology of the people 
they sought to mobilise.104 Because they lacked Islamic credentials, they turned 
towards Shaykh Sa‘id Sh‘aban and asked him to become their public face. Jund 
Allah joined Tawhid three months later, and gave additional Islamic legitimacy to 
the movement. 
 Tawhid is often described as a movement supported by Iran, but recent 
empirical research indicates that Iran supported shaykh Sa‘id Sh‘aban more than 
Tawhid as such.105 Other leaders within Tawhid, Mrad and Akkawi in particular, 
were closer to Fatah than to Iran (although Akkawi travelled three times to Iran 
before he was killed).106 Tawhid fought on Fatah’s side in the Syrian-Palestinian 
war in Autumn 1983. When Fatah evacuated, it left its weapons with Tawhid and 
this facilitated a further Tawhid takeover of Tripoli. Tawhid waged battles against 
the Iraqi Ba‘ath party and killed several dozen members of the communist party. It 
declared the creation of an Islamic emirate, imposed its own preachers to teach 
religion in public and private schools and created a morality police. The Syrian 
army besieged Tripoli but let Tawhid retain power. In September 1985, the 
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communist party, the SSNP and other secularist parties, bolstered by Syrian 
support, gave an ultimatum to Tawhid, where they demanded to be allowed to 
return to Tripoli. A 21-day battle ended with an armistice signed in Damascus, the 
Damascus II agreement. Although Syria was a party to the conflict, Abdel-Halim 
Khaddam publically fronted himself as a mediator.  
 According to the Damascus II Agreement, Tawhid gave up their weapons and 
control of the city to the internal security forces (i.e. Syrian intelligence) in return 
for impunity. The agreement was not respected by Syria. Large waves of arrest of 
Tawhid members ensued. The first Tawhid leader to be assassinated was Khalil 
Akkawi, killed at a Syrian roadblock in February 1986. Others killed in the same 
period included Abd al-Karim al-Biddawi, a cadre and shayhk of Jund Allah107 and 
Abu Rabi‘a al-Kurdiyyeh, an al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya [JI] member who had played a 
prominent role in the battle against the Syrian army in 1985. Many of those killed 
were of the Maoist-Islamist line, and had been part of Fatah’s Student Brigade.108 
The killings and assassinations led to the flight of most Tawhid first- and second- 
rank leaders from Tripoli.  
 In December 1986, former Tawhid members attempted an “Intifada” in Tripoli, 
and attacked and killed 15 Syrian soldiers at a checkpoint in Bab al-Tebbaneh.109 
This led to a strong Syrian reaction. On 21 and 22 December 1986, Syrian troops 
sealed off Tebbaneh, while Ali Eid’s Alawi Red Knight militia and Tareq Fakhr al-
Din’s Tripoli resistance went into the district and committed the killings.110 At least 
200 people were killed, though the actual number of deaths was never established.  
 Although Syria affirmed that those who died were “those who had put up 
resistance during armed clashes”,111 eyewitness reported that most of those killed 
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were civilians, political supporters and/or family members of Khalil Akkawi’s. 
They were executed in front of their homes during the night, often in their pyjamas. 
Machine-guns, rocket-propelled grenades and tanks were used in the house-to-
house search operations throughout the district. One of the first persons killed was 
the father of Riyadh al-Rifa‘i, a religious shaykh. The Syrian army went to his 
house and asked his wife who to kill, the father or the son.112 Most families in 
Tebbaneh had someone of their households who died or disappeared during the 
massacre. In total, several hundred people were reported “missing”. An unknown 
number of people are still kept in Syrian jails. Although members of Tareq Fakhr 
al-Din’s Tripoli resistance were working class Sunni Muslims who had joined for 
money, the massacre went down in the collective memory of Sunni Tripolitanians 
as one committed by the Alawi leader Ali Eid and the Syrian regime against the 
Sunnis. Unlike the Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which the killings had little 
potential political and military gains – since the PLO commandos had already left 
Lebanon, the massacre in Tebbaneh was part of a broader strategy of political 
domination. 113 During and following the massacre the Syrian army took control of 
Tebbaneh. Another aim was to create enmity between Sunnis in Tebbaneh and 
Alawis in Jabal Mohsen. Since Eid’s Red Knights militia had played an important 
role in the massacre, Alawis began to feel more vulnerable and more dependent on 
Syria for their survival.  
 
The impact of the Syrian civil war (1976-1982) on Tripoli  
Tripoli was also affected by the armed confrontation within Syria pitting the Asad 
regime against Sunni Muslim opposition members from Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. 
This also explained the Syrian attempts to control Tripoli. After a massacre in April 
1981 in Aleppo, clashes between Sunnis and Alawis within the Syrian army 
stationed in Lebanon were reported. 114  Publications by the Syrian Muslim 
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Brotherhood (MB), which described Alawis as inheritors of a long history of plots 
and subversion against Muslims, stretching from the sacking of the Ka‘aba by the 
Qarmates in the 9th century until the loss of the Golan in 1967, were distributed in 
Tripoli.115 Nasheeds (songs) supportive of the struggle of the Syrian MB found 
their way to Tripoli, where they were played by sympathising Islamic activists. The 
Aleppean famous nasheed singer Mohamed Abu Ratib, who was affiliated with the 
Syrian MB and wrote many anti-Asad songs, dedicated one song to “the battle for 
Tripoli” against Syria and the massacre in Bab al-Tebbaneh. This was a way to link 
the two struggles and portray them as one.  
 After the sacking of Hama in 1982, some dozens of Syrian Ikhwan came to 
Tripoli fleeing persecution in Syria.116 Approximately ten were from the Fighting 
Vanguard.117 This occurred because of the close and persistent contact between the 
Lebanese Jamaa Islamiya (JI) and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and more 
generally between the population in North Lebanon and the Syrian hinterland. Yet, 
as Salim Allouche, a former coordinator of JI’s political office in North Lebanon 
pointed out in an interview (February 2009), their number was exaggerated for 
political reasons. It provided the Syrian regime a justification to impose stronger 
political control on Tripoli. Allouche argued that there were no more than 50 such 
fugitives in Tripoli, who all arrived in Lebanon as separate individuals. Azzam 
Ayubi, currently leader of JI’s politbureau, estimated the number to be 200.118 Both 
emphasised that the refugees were second and third rank members. Syrian Ikhwan 
leaders almost exclusively fled to Amman, where the Brotherhood’s leadership 
relocated after it was declared illegal in 1980. Sojourns in Syrian-controlled 
Lebanon were complicated for Syrian members of the opposition. 
 While individual JI members may have supported the quest of the Sunni 
Muslim majority in Syria,119 JI as an organisation was not involved in the conflict. 
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JI opposed the fight pursued by the Syrian MBs in the 1970s and the beginning of 
the 1980s and did not act as a “Syrian MB auxiliary”.120 JI was organisationally 
tied to the MB network, but had from the outset chosen a more pragmatic political 
strategy than the Syrian and Egyptian Brotherhoods. Shaykhs in Lebanon 
considered that the Syrian MB had a “simplistic and idealistic style”. The fact that 
the Islamist uprising failed in Syria demonstrated that it could never work in 
Lebanon, because of the plural Lebanese society.121 Tawhid’s war against the 
Syrian regime was distinct from the Syrian MB’s confrontation against the same 
regime. The war in Bab al-Tebbaneh against the Syrian army and Ali Eid’s Arab 
Democratic Party were expressions of Yasser Arafat’s war against the Syrian 
regime. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the PLO, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq had a 
common adversary in Syria, and this common interest united them.122  
 
Tripoli’s Salafis and the Syrian regime 
Salafism had first gained a foothold in Tripoli when a generation of students of 
religion from Tripoli travelled to the Islamic University of Medina in the 1980s. 
Once their studies were completed, they returned to their hometown and 
established Shar‘ia Institutes. Salafi ideology was not “imported” to Lebanon 
without modifications, but adapted to the Lebanese social reality. Da‘i al-Shahal 
calls himself the “founder of Salafism”in Lebanon”. 123 He studied in Saudi Arabia 
between 1980 and 1984 and returned to Tripoli and opened the Guidance and Well-
doing Institute (al-hidaya wa’l-ihsan) in 1988.124 Al-Shahal quickly rose to become 
the most prominent Salafi cleric in Tripoli. He directed five Islamic institutes in 
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Lebanon and administrated the “Guidance radio”, and large welfare projects in 
Sunni regions in Lebanon.125  
 The centre received funding from many of the large Islamic charities in Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.126 Most of the Saudi funds were channelled through the 
al-Haramayn institution (mu’assassat al-haramayn), one of the largest Saudi 
charities, which closed down in 2004, after US pressure.127 Although the institution 
was close to the Saudi state ‘Ulama and the monarchy, it was also known to fund 
more politicised Salafists abroad. This reflected Saudi Arabia’s willingness to 
counterbalance Iran’s funding to Shi‘a Islamists. Another important sponsor was 
the Kuwaiti Ahya al-Turath association, which funded al-Shahal for three or four 
years.128  
 The Guidance and Well-Doing Institute educated most Salafi high school 
graduates in Lebanon and employed a large number of the returnees from the 
Islamic University of Medina. The teaching staff included graduates from the 
Islamic University of Medina, such as Ra’ed Hlayhel, Mohamed Khodr, and 
shaykh Ahmad, a Palestinian from Nahr al-Bared. Another teacher, Safwan al-
Zu‘abi, was a businessman who had studied Arabic literature for two years and 
only studied Shar‘ia at the local mosques.129 There were also other teachers with 
future bonds to the global Jihadi movement, including Nabil Rahim, arrested in 
2008, accused of being second-in-command of “al-Qaida and Fatah al-Islam” in 
Lebanon and the coordinator between Jihadists in Lebanon and actors in the global 
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Jihadi network.130 Another teacher, Omar al-Y’ali, was a former member of the 
Tabligh society, who developed close bonds to Lebanese Salafi Jihadis in the 
Diaspora and in Ayn al-Helweh.131 
 In 1996 the Guidance and Well-Doing Institute was closed down by a decision 
of the Lebanese Interior Minister Michel al-Murr, for “inciting confessional hatred” 
(na’arat taifiyya). 132 Four employees of the institute, including al-Shahal’s brother, 
were jailed for two months. 133 The decision was based on the paragraph in a book 
used in the Institute’s curriculum, entitled Contemporary Branches Belonging to 
Islam and the Declarations of Position of Islam towards These. The book was 
written by a Saudi scholar and member of the teaching council (hi’at al-tadris) at 
the Islamic University in Medina.134 A chapter on the Alawis (nusayriyyun),135 
reproduced in one the Guidance and Well-Doing Institute’s textbooks, not only 
described the sect as apostates but indicated that the Syrian regime was in secret 
agreement with the Israeli government on the Golan question.136 The introductory 
paragraph of the chapter on the Alawis read: 
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The Nusayris, as the others of the Esoteric sects are among the enemies of 
the Islamic doctrine […] The closest example of the positions of the 
Nusayris is what happens in Muslim areas in Syria and Lebanon, where 
they killed innocent men, women, and children; another is the alliance of 
the Alawis with Maronites and Khomeinists. The Alawis also encouraged 
tensions in the old days. While the Crusaders slaughtered Muslims […], 
they did not do so with the Alawis, but recognised their holy book. Alawis 
create fitna because they lie in the same trenches as the enemies of Muslims 
against Muslims […]. Between the Alawis and the Jews there is love, and 
they concur on many principles. A certification of this fact came with the 
Six Day War as they call it. What happened during it is one of many 
indications on the positions and enmity of the Alawis towards Ahl al-Sunna 
[…].137 
Moreover, the same chapter directly mentioned the Hama massacre – 
stressing “we shall not forget Hama” and emphasised Ali Eid’s role in 
“plotting” against Sunnis in Lebanon: 
When the Nusayri Ali Eid set himself up as the leader of the Nusayri 
organisation in Tripoli, the owner of the Lebanese al-Hawadith magazine138 
paid attention to this and was killed by a plot of the Alawis. There are also 
many other examples indicating that the Alawis are not convinced of the 
appropriateness of their own sect.139  
  
 The book was used in courses at Saudi universities, including the Umm al-Qura 
University in Mecca in the 1990s and 2000s. This shows the difference between the 
Saudi Arabian and the Lebanese contexts, and, in particular, the red lines in 
Lebanon during the years of Syrian authoritarianism. Al-Shahal’s official narrative 
                                                
137 Awaji, Contemporary Branches, pp. 533-534. My translation. 
138 This paragraph refers to the killing of Salim al-Lawzi, a renowned Arab journalist and the owner 
of the Lebanese pro-Saudi al-Hawadith (“Events”) magazine. Al-Lawzi was born in Tripoli, but 
moved to London in 1976 after receiving death threats. When he returned to Lebanon for his 
mother’s funeral in February 1980, he was abducted by gunmen. Fouad Ajami, The Arab 
Predicament, p. 2. 
139 Awaji, Contemporary Branches, p. 549. My translation. 




of the closure of the Guidance and Well-Doing Institute was that it was a Syrian 
reaction to his growing strength. The growing popularity of the Salafi Da‘awa had 
“irritated the Syrian regime”, and made it realise that the presence of the Guidance 
and Well-Doing Institute was not in its interest:  
 The Syrian regime wanted the totality of the Islamic movements to be under its 
command and to work solely under its guidance. They want the Islamic movements 
to be an instrument (wasat) of the Syrian regime, as does the Ahbash and others. I 
was an unacceptable opponent (mu‘atarid ghayr shar‘iy). My doctrine, thoughts, 
and policies were against them. […] I did not enter into a conflict with the Syrians 
but doctrinally I am a Salafist and they are Nusayris. They don’t believe in the 
religion. In the depth of their hearts, they have a “party spirit” (ta‘assub) towards 
the Alawi sect and the Shias. 140 
 In 2000, Da‘i al-Shahal’s name was mentioned in the indictment against the 
“Dinniyeh Group”, which fought against the Lebanese army for six days in 
December 1999 and January 2000.141 He fled Lebanon for Saudi Arabia and did 
not return until the men arrested in the Diniyyeh affair were pardoned and released 
in July 2005. Shortly after he had left Lebanon, al-Shahal was sentenced to death in 
absentia. Although the common interpretation is that the Guidance and Well-Doing 
Institute was closed down by the Syrians, because of the above-mentioned book, 
Bernard Rougier – the most established specialist on Salafism in Lebanon – has 
argued that according to the rumours at the time, al-Shahal diffused a tape with a 
sermon of Saudi oppositionist alim, Salman al-Awda on the Guidance and Well-
Doing radio. The Saudi regime therefore asked the Lebanese authorities to close 
the Institute.142 Although direct evidence that the Saudi Embassy was behind the 
closure is hard to find, the idea that Syria, at times, had interests in common with 
the Salafis was confirmed by the author’s own empirical findings, detailed below. 
 When discussing the question of Salafism in Tripoli, it must not be forgotten 
than the rise of Salafism occurred simultaneously with the Syrian presence and that 
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during Pax Syriana nothing could happen in Tripoli except with Syrian indirect 
endorsement. The presence of Da‘i al-Shahal in Tripoli suited the Asad regime, 
because he called on his followers not to vote and thus helped weaken the clout of 
Rafiq Hariri and other representatives of Lebanese political Sunnism.143 It also 
fragmented the religious scene and the influence of JI.144 Although the JI leadership 
had accepted the Pax Syriana, not all its cadres and members in North Lebanon 
accepted all of Syria’s practices. Khaled Daher, a JI parliamentarian who served 
between 1996 and 2000, was so vocal in his criticism that Syria vetoed his name in 
the 2000 parliamentary elections.145  
 Syria supported the rise of different strands of Salafism by “neglecting it”. 
Many observers of the field of Islamism in Tripoli have pointed out that although 
al-Shahal always represented himself as someone persecuted during the Syrian 
period, his influence over Salafism in Tripoli was stronger in the 1990s than after 
he returned in 2005.146 Al-Shahal, like all other institutional actors at the time, was 
obliged to interact with the Syrian intelligence147  and became “indirectly supported 
by the Syrian security services”.148  Perceptions were often more important in 
politics than reality – and the closure of the institute was framed in the post-2005 
period as a result of Syrian repression. The closure of the institute made is possible 
for Da‘i al-Shahhal to make the Salafis look like victims of the Syrian intelligence 
services. This boosted al-Shahhal’s credibility among anti-Syrian Lebanese Sunnis. 
Moreover, the idea that the Syrian army protected North Lebanon against Sunni 
Salafi Jihadi extremists was an argument that the Syrian regime used frequently in 
the 1990s. It became one of Syria’s main arguments for maintaining a presence in 
Lebanon after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000.149 The 
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presence of Jihadi groups in North Lebanon created an image of Tripoli as a 
“cradle of terrorism”, which justified the Syrian presence, especially vis-à-vis the 
West. 150  The Syrian regime could afford more ambivalence towards Sunni 
Islamists in Lebanon than within its own country.  
 The Salafi networks in Tripoli were autonomous and had their own leadership 
and support networks. It would be reductionist to reduce them to Syrian 
manipulation. Yet, Salafi youth did not always have a clear perception of the 
enemy. In the words of Nir Rosen: “the ideology of Jihad often seemed less 
important than the sheer will to fight – against whoever could be found”.151 Which 
target they finally chose depended on what those who provided them with 
weapons, money, and ammunition told them to do.152 The Syrian intelligence 
agents were aware of this ambivalence and helped orient the activism of zealous 
Salafi youth in Lebanon and Syria towards targets associated with US imperialism, 
and away from targeting the Asad regime and its allies and protégés. This became 
even more evident after the US-led invasion of Iraq and the beginning of the Iraqi 
insurgency, when Damascus gave free passage to Salafi Jihadis who wanted to 
fight the Americans in Iraq. The Asad regime considered Salafis helpful in creating 
an anti-American atmosphere in Lebanon and Syria following the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. 
 The policy continued after the Syrian withdrawal: Syria furnished vital birth-
help to the nucleus of Fatah al-Islam, which fought the Lebanese army in the 
Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared in 2007. The group was created by former 
prisoners in Syria with the aim to create tensions within the Sunni community and 
hence weaken the political project of Saad Hariri.153 Syria was therefore an arsonist 
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fire-fighter vis-à-vis radical Islamist groups in Lebanon. Thus, while Salafis 
emerged independently of Syrian manipulation, the Asad regime skilfully 
“neglected” Tripoli’s Salafis in order to split the Sunni Islamist field and uphold 
“security vacuums” in Tripoli. Moreover, once the Salafi Jihadis were there, the 
Syrian regime was skilled at orienting Salafi violence against American and 
international targets, rather than against the Asad regime itself. 
 
Did the Syrian regime have an anti-Sunni policy? 
The Syrian tutelage, between 1976 and 2005, coincided with a loss of momentum 
for the Sunni political leaderships in Lebanon. A general crisis of political 
representation of the Sunni community in Lebanon began in the second half of the 
1980s. There had traditionally not been specific political parties for Sunnis in 
Lebanon.154 Sunnis were coreligionists of the Ottomans and saw themselves as a 
majority in the broader Arab Middle East. Political leaders of the Sunnis were 
notables and therefore usually not activist, although they supported the Palestinian 
cause. During the civil war, Sunnis in Lebanon had generally speaking not enrolled 
in sectarian militias. Sunni notables did not participate in the war, but were 
mediators, while the urban poor fought for the PLO in alliance with left-wingers 
from other Lebanese sects. An exception was the aforementioned Islamic Tawhid 
movement in Tripoli.  
 The crisis of political representation of Sunnis began with the evacuation of the 
PLO from Lebanon in the 1982-83 period. This weakened the Lebanese Sunni 
community relative to other Lebanese sects. The two exclusively Sunni militias in 
Lebanon, allied with Fatah, al-Murabitun in Beirut and Tawhid in Tripoli, were 
both crushed by Syria and its allies. Syria subsequently helped Hizbullah gain 
control of the frontline with Israel. After 1985, 90 per cent of the so-called 
resistance acts against Israel were Hizbullah’s work.155 Arab nationalism lost its 
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impetus. The PLO began negotiation with Israel, and Hamas was patronised by 
Syria and Iran. Lebanese Sunnis no longer had a militant cause. Sunnis became 
jealous of Hizbullah and began to see political Shi‘ism as their main source of 
alterity. 
 Sunni leaders were not awarded control over an institution of state patronage 
they could use to consolidate their leadership, such as the Ministry of the Displaced 
People controlled by Jumblatt and the Council of the South, controlled by Nabih 
Berry. All these factors made it difficult for new Sunni leaders to emerge during 
the 1990-2005 period. Sunni urban poor quarters were heavily penetrated by the 
Syrian intelligence. Sunni leaders had lost touch with the population during the 
war. The new leaders were nouveaux riches businessmen with little historical 
legitimacy – or little legitimacy at all. They were patronised by Syrian intelligence, 
which vetoed all those electoral candidates of whom it disapproved. Loyalty 
increasingly became transactional. Some attributed the crisis of Sunni political 
representation in Lebanon to Syrian policies and argued that Damascus had a 
specific Sunni policy in Lebanon, to curb the autonomy of Lebanese Sunnis for 
domestic political reasons. Rougier relates the Syrian ‘preventive repression’ in 
North Lebanon to the large Sunni majority in the region.156  
 Certain aspects of Syria’s policies indicated that Syria followed an anti-Sunni 
policy in Lebanon. Specific Syrian arrangements during the 1980s and 1990s 
disfavoured the Lebanese Sunni community, and particularly, in Tripoli. For 
instance, the Tripartite Damascus agreement signed in 1985 between the three 
militia-leaders Walid Jumblatt, Elie Hobeiqa and Nabih Berry left out the Sunnis 
and the Palestinians.157 Moreover, during the 1990s, no institution of patronage was 
allocated to any Sunni politician in Tripoli. Asad feared that Sunni politicians 
might consolidate a political leadership at odds with Syria. Therefore, the Syrian 
regime made it clear to PM Rafiq Hariri that Tripoli was theirs and not a territory 
he could attempt to penetrate politically. 
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 Syria also continued to give strong political support to Lebanon’s Alawis, 
against the Sunnis. In 1991, two parliamentary seats were created for the Alawi 
minority in North Lebanon. Ali Eid obtained one, but was replaced with a figure 
more acceptable to Tripoli’s Sunnis in 1996.158 However, Syria did have many 
allies among the Sunnis in Tripoli, in particular traditional Sunni leaders from the 
bourgeois classes. While the Sunni urban poor were excluded from institutional 
politics in the 1990s and 2000s, traditional, secular politicians gained power in the 
Lebanese system. Few, if any, Tripolitanian MPs during the 1990 period opposed 
Syria.159 This was because the Syrian intelligence vetoed all electoral candidates 
they opposed. This occurred during a period where Lebanese electoral candidates 
had to pay bribes to Syrian intelligence to appear on electoral list. This practice was 
widely known and contributed to discrediting electoral politics among the 
Lebanese.160  
 Despite the alignment between Sunni leaders and Syria at the surface, there 
were signs that many Sunnis were uneasy with the Syrian practices. One tell-tale 
came already in 1992, when Ahmad Fakhr al-Din, the brother of the leader of the 
Tripoli Resistance, who had been supported by Syrian intelligence, presented 
himself for parliamentary elections. Anonymous flyers were distributed in Tripoli’s 
poor quarters against the Fakhr al-Din brothers with the slogan, ‘Do not forget the 
Tebbaneh massacre.’. In 1996, Samir Frangié, the politician from Zgharta, obtained 
12, 000 votes from Tripoli, a third of his total votes in the electoral district. 161 That 
was a high number, particularly compared to Omar Karami’s 14,000 votes in 
Tripoli. Frangié succeeded because he allied himself with one of Khalil Akkawi’s 
former comrades-in-arms and because he represented a line antagonistic to the 
Syrian regime. Another indication of Tripolitanian opposition to Syria was that 
Rafiq Hariri became very popular in Tripoli after he began to oppose the Syrian 
regime in the 2003-2004 period.  
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 The above could indicate that Syria was not necessarily afraid of Islamists, 
because it was so easy to manipulate them. Syria was more afraid of the emergence 
of a strong and independent political Sunni leaders in the Levant region, with 
international contacts and which could give ideas to Syria’s Sunnis. Examples of 
such strong and independent leaders could be Yasser Arafat’s Fatah (in the 1980s), 
Rafiq Hariri (until 2005) and his son, Saad Hariri (after 2005). Yet, the focus on 
confessionalism should not be over-rated. It should be combined with the economic 
motivations, discussed in the next section. 
 
The Syrian-Lebanese informal economy 
Until now the discussion has implied that the greater Syrian control of north 
Lebanon, occurred as a result of a Syrian plan, because Syria feared Sunni Fatah 
activists or Sunni Islamists in Tripoli. A competing hypothesis may be that Syrian-
Lebanese ties developed without a political plan, as a result of the joint interests in 
the war economy. In other words, the Asad regime had no plan to control Tripoli 
more intrusively, but officers in the Syrian army developed particular economic 
interests in north Lebanon. During the Syrian tutelage, trans-state economic ties 
created overlapping interests between the Syrian regime, Syrian merchants, and 
Lebanese merchants. It was a win-win situation for most parties and contributed to 
consolidating Syrian tutelage. The big loser was the Lebanese state, whose 
revenues shrank by half over 10 years. 162  The Syrian-Lebanese networks 
introduced new norms in Tripoli, where short-term profit became more important 
than sustainable economic policies aiming at job creation. Thus, the Syrian-
Lebanese networks created a new “moral community” in North Lebanon, which 
competed with the former Islamic and anti-imperialistic values of Tripolitanian 
Sunnism.163 A new Syrian-Lebanese economic entrepreneurial class emerged. 
 Because of differences in climate, vegetation, and natural resources, the 
economies of Syria and Lebanon had always been complimentary. Although 
custom tariffs were introduced in 1950, trans-border economic exchange grew 
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during the 1960s, especially in the informal sector: After the beginning of the 
nationalisations of the Ba‘ath party in the 1960s, Lebanon was increasingly used as 
a backyard for Syria’s own informal sector. Syrian capital fled to Lebanon.164 The 
imbrications of the Syrian and the Lebanese economies reached its peak during the 
Syrian tutelage, when most of the Lebanese economy fell under Syrian control. The 
main reason for this was that the Syrian economy was hit by a severe crisis in the 
1980s, when purchasing power fell drastically. 165 The country experienced a 
foreign exchange bankruptcy, and was forced to drastically reduce imports.166 Few 
commodities could be found at Syrian official markets, yet everything could be 
found on the black markets. Control over strategic sectors in the Lebanese 
economy became crucial to the survival of the Syrian economy, and regime, in the 
period. 
 Syrian business entrepreneurs in Lebanon, with connections to the army and the 
regime, invested in specific industries, of which there was a shortage inside Syria 
proper. For instance, a large banking sector was developed in Zahleh between 1983 
and 1984. 167  The Lebanese economic space was important for those social 
categories who came to matter the most for the Asad regime in the 1990s and 
2000s: army officers, who controlled large parts of the Lebanese economy; 
Damascene merchants, courtiers, and intermediaries;168 and, from the late 1980s, a 
new Syrian class of business entrepreneurs linked to the regime.169 Syria initially 
saw the Lebanese economic bourgeoisie as a competitor, and not a partner to its 
own businesses. 170 Yet, as the Syrian presence in Lebanon lasted, Lebanese 
                                                
164 Kassir, ‘Dix ans après’, p. 14. 
165 Wages had grown twofold in the 1980s and prices sevenfold.  
166 The bankruptcy was due to a large import of consumer goods and ambitious industrialisation 
efforts. By 1986, only 40% of imports were covered by exports.  
167 Picard, ‘La politique de la Syrie au Liban’, p. 8. 
168 Picard, ‘La politique de la Syrie au Liban’, p. 8; Volker Peres, The political economy of Syria 
under Assad, London: I. B. Tauris, 1997, 1995, pp. 49-61. 
169 For an analysis, see: Joseph Bahout, Les entrepreneurs syriens: économie, affaires et politique, 
Beirut: Les cahiers de CERMOC, 1994; Maria Wadjinny, ‘Les entrepreneurs de Bachar. Stratégies 
sociales et politiques des entrepreneurs privés face à la politique économique de Bachar al-Assad’, 
MA thesis, Paris: IEP de Paris, 2008.  
170 Hinnebusch, ‘Pax syriana?’, p. 142. 




entrepreneurship was compelled to not compete with, but to complement, the 
expanding Syrian private sector. 171 
 
Smuggling and trafficking in North Lebanon 
During the war, militia leaders and other war profiteers enriched themselves 
through illegal construction, real-estate speculation, export of refined products of 
cannabis and the opium poppy produced in the Beqa‘a, money raised from illegal 
taxes imposed on the civilians and on goods passing through the ports controlled by 
various militias.172 The development of the war economy is one of the central 
reasons for the durability of the Lebanese war. The war economy made the militias 
richer and less dependent on external support. 
 The war economy in North Lebanon mattered to Syrian army officers, because 
they controlled a greater share than elsewhere. In coordination with the warring 
Lebanese militias, they were able to control key infrastructure, including the port, 
the refinery in Beddawi and the Chekka cement works. The cement works was 
initially controlled by Frangié’s Marada militia and constituted the main source of 
the revenues of the latter.173 It became a particularly important recipient of Syrian 
investments because Syria itself lacked construction materials at the time.174 The 
oil refinery was managed by a group of Lebanese politicians and businessmen, in 
coordination with the Syrian army. Elements of Ali Haydar’s Wahdat Khassa 
[Special Units] were based inside the refinery.175  
 Tareq Fakhr al-Din, the Syria-linked Sunni businessman, also had a central 
role. In the 1980s, he was given economic privileges in exchange for establishing 
the Tripoli Resistance, a militia funded and armed by the Syrian intelligence. The 
participation of the Tripoli Resistance in the massacre in Bab al-Tebbaneh soon 
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became a taboo among many Sunnis in Tripoli, who only remembered the Alawi 
responsibility. Fakhr al-Din became a respectable businessman, and his “Palma” 
beach resort, built up with war profits and drug money in the 1980s without a 
construction permit, quickly became one of the most popular in Tripoli.  
 The port of Tripoli, controlled by the Karami family, was the second largest in 
Lebanon176 and used for hashish smuggling towards Turkey. It was in the early 
1970s a major route for PLO supplies and reinforcement, and this continued more 
covertly during the Syrian presence.177 However, the high number of taxes and 
impositions made it expensive, and other ports were opened north of Tripoli. 178 
These were used for the smuggling of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and electrical 
domestic appliances towards Syria. During a short period in the 1980s, the 
Minqara-led branch of the Tawhid movement seized control over the port,179 in 
coordination with Rifa‘at al-Asad and his son Firas.180 The royalties from the port 
made Minqara a very wealthy man 181  and helped his militia gain financial 
independence.182 Mustafa Allouche, an anti-Syrian and anti-Islamist political leader 
in Tripoli, estimates lost taxes to a value of 600 million dollars.183  
 Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon had existed since the creation of 
borders between the countries, even during the customs union, which lasted until 
1950. 184 It was amplified by the growing differentiation of the two economies in 
the 1960s. During the civil war, Akkar became the passageway between Syria and 
Lebanon for smuggling of construction materials, electrical domestic, and 
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foodstuffs.185 Because of the wartime isolation of Tripoli from Beirut, merchants 
began importing directly through the port of Tripoli, instead of through Beirut.186 
They developed relations of confidence with Syrian traders on the other side of the 
border, who smuggled the goods using small pick-ups.187 Smuggling took place 
everywhere, at all passage points. One route went through the village of Madaya, 
just south of al-Zabadani and near the Masn‘a border, which developed into an 
important village of cross-border traffic. Smugglers also passed from north 
Lebanon and along the Syrian coast, through Masyaf and Tartus. There were more 
than 50 clandestine ports in North Lebanon and on the Syrian coastline, where one 
embarked goods on the sea, in arrangement with the customs officials. If they 
refused to let goods pass, smugglers could kill them. One passage point was 
controlled by a man called Hassan Makhluf, known to do “happy hours” where 
smugglers passed in exchange for a financial compensation.188  
 The trafficking arrangement benefited Syrian army officers and their friends, 
who imposed regularised taxes for vans and trucks.189 The same figures as those 
controlling Tripoli’s port and refinery were also important in the trafficking 
business. Fakhr al-Din and his brother, Ahmad, trafficked aluminium, wood and 
iron purchased from pirates,190 in addition to drugs. Jamil al-Asad’s two sons, 
Fawaz and Munzar, played leading roles in the lucrative smuggling of electronics 
and consumer goods from Lebanon towards Syria and Turkey. 191  Fawaz, a 
corporate lawyer in a leather jacket who had bought all of his diplomas, had 
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already accumulated wealth through racketeering in Latakia.192 Fawaz and Munthar 
al-Asad were known for extolling and working with Tripoli’s businessmen.193  
 Since Tripoli was geographically close to Syria, and in particular to Latakia 
where both men lived, personal links developed between Tripoli’s businessmen and 
Jamil al-Asad’s sons. Syrian army officers became heavily involved in trafficking 
and contraband of stolen goods. Army commanders did not crush these practices, 
but gave army officers and soldiers the opportunity to resort to corruption, theft, 
and even vandalisation for personal enrichment or power purposes.194 For many 
Lebanese, this reflected the character of the Damascus regime as a military-
mercantile crony coalition, which used power as a source of personal 
enrichment.195 Thus, for the Syrian military constituency, the rent from illicit 
activities in Lebanon provided an alternative to oil-rent. 196 The petroleum sector 
had between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s constituted 70 per cent of the value of 
Syria’s total export value, but declined afterwards.197 One particularly lucrative 
sector was the booming drug trade, which benefited all sides of the conflict, and 
which linked the Lebanese militias up with European and Eastern mafias.  
 Most of the drug passed through the port of Beirut and and transported towards 
Europe, but the port of Tripoli was used for hashish smuggling towards Turkey.198 
Rifa‘at al-Asad and his son Firas levied heavy taxes on this traffic.199 Fakhr al-Din 
gained most of his fortune from wartime drug trade.200 Drugs also passed from the 
Beqa‘a to Tell Qalakh and Homs. Opium- and cannabis traffickers and merchants 
were often members of Lebanese political parties or militias, who used opium to 
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finance warfare and exchanged drugs for weapons from the European and Eastern 
mafias.201 As with the case of all other smuggling and war economy activity, 
warring militia leaders cooperated in smuggling and dispatching drugs, which 
flowed unrestricted through all frontlines without difficulties.202  
 
Lebanese dependence on the Syrian-Lebanese networks  
Economic interaction reaffirmed the strong social and historical links between 
Tripoli and its Syrian hinterland, mainly Homs, Tartus and Latakia. The same 
families were present on both sides of the international border, and in the period of 
the Syrian tutelage, children in certain villages in Akkar near the border went to 
school in Syria, where enrolment fees were considerably lower. 203  Another 
dimension of the complementarity between the two economies was the dependence 
of the Syrian workforce on the Lebanese labour market. Tripoli received a 
particularly high number of the Syrian migratory workers. Many were ambulant 
sellers, who gathered around the Abu Ali River. 204 Syrian workers numbered up to 
a million in Lebanon and made up between 20 and 40 per cent of the Lebanese 
workforce. They helped alleviate unemployment and poverty in Syria proper.205 
Contractors in Lebanon depended on their cheap labour. However, Lebanese 
labourers were put out of work by their Syrian counterparts, who did not pay taxes 
in Lebanon. 
 Lebanese entrepreneurs became increasingly dependent on Syria in the 1990s. 
They benefited from the opening of the Syrian economy and banking sector in the 
1990s, and obtained licences to operate in Syria. Endorsement of the Syrian regime 
also became necessary to do business on a large-scale within Lebanon.206 Indeed, 
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those entrepreneurs, who came to dominate Lebanese economy in the after-war era, 
were close to the Syrian regime and army. In Tripoli, the joint ventures between 
Syrian military elites and Tripolitanian businessmen developed new patterns of 
sociability. Syrian military officers became close to Tripoli’s elites, and, as 
elsewhere in Lebanon, exchanged visits, and met for lunches and drinks.207 The 
wives of the Syrian military officers became friends with the wives of Tripolitanian 
political elites and businessmen.208 
 Smuggling, illegal construction, and other parasitic activities helped create a 
new class of nouveaux riches Lebanese, and Tripolitanians, during the war. A 
considerable number of northern MPs of the 1990s had gained their fortune from 
trafficking activities that had begun during the war. Common interests developed 
as a result of these trans-state economic ties, and a network of actors favourable to 
a Syrian “solution” in Lebanon emerged.209 This new and growing Syro-Lebanese 
entrepreneurial elite consolidated Syrian control over Lebanon. It included central 
figures in the political establishment; others were businessmen who entered the 
political arena in the late 1990s.  
 Najib Miqati, who served as Lebanese Prime Minister in 2005 and between 
2011 and 2013, is one example. He entered politics in 1998 as Minister of Public 
Works and Transport and was elected MP in 2000. A considerable part of Miqati’s 
fortune was earned in the mobile phone industry in Syria and Lebanon.210 In both 
cases, favourable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts 211  were obtained 
through the close friendship with governmental caretakers, PM Rafiq Hariri in 
Lebanon and Bashar al-Asad and Rami Makhlouf in Syria.212 In 2002, Orascom 
was pushed out of Syriatel after a row with Rami Makhlouf. 213 The episode 
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revealed that it was difficult to operate in the telecommunications sector in Syria 
without the consent of the influential Makhloufs. Miqati was also given an 
important role when Hashim Minqara and Samir al-Hassan were released from 
prison in 2000, which helped the former gain Islamist votes in the 2000 legislative 
election. 
 Ahmad Hbous, the late businessman who took over the Alawi seat in 
parliament in 1996 from Ali Eid, also gained his fortune as a contractor in Syria 
and Lebanon. Other prominent members of the rising Syro-Lebanese bourgeoisie 
outside of Tripoli included Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Rafiq Hariri, who 
developed business partnerships during the 1990s and prior to the Syrian 
withdrawal.214 Rafiq Hariri aided Khaddam’s son to establish himself in business. 
Other less prominent actors were Lebanese bankers, on whom Syrian entrepreneurs 
relied because of the failure to liberalise banks in Syria. In the 2000s, when 
branches of Lebanese banks were opened in Damascus, the interdependence 
continued. 
 Hence, the control over Tripoli’s economy was a joint venture between the 
notable families of Tripoli and the Syrian military officers, and contributed to 
solidifying ties between the two. Local politicians were interwoven into the Syrian 
orbit to the extent that they constituted one social fabric. In the parliamentary 
elections of 1992, characterised by the Christian boycott, controlling candidates in 
the North helped the Syrian regime install a political system in favour of the Pax 
Syriana. The cooperation, shared economic benefits, and common interest in the 
perpetuation of Syrian influence in Lebanon helped modify norms and identities in 




North Lebanon, unlike the south and the Beqa‘a, was not direct soil of the conflict 
with Israel and the motivations for Syrian control over Tripoli were not geo-
political. North Lebanon’s informal economy benefited Syrian military officers and 
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Lebanese merchants. The rise of common economic interests consolidated already 
existing family ties between North Lebanon and Tripoli’s Syrian hinterland. 
Moreover, the Asad regime had, for tactical, and not confessional, reasons 
developed a particular “Sunni policy” in Lebanon. The aim was to hinder the 
emergence of a popular Sunni za‘im, but also generally to fragment Lebanese 
society. The relationship with the Sunni Islamist movements in Tripoli was highly 
ambivalent. Contestation in Tripoli was the perfect excuse to perpetuate the Syrian 
presence.  
 Syrian policy makers held a very high degree of expertise on Lebanese 
geography and population, which helped them adapt concrete policies to each 
region. The knowledge of the Lebanese terrain was so intimate, and Syrian and 
Lebanese societies imbricated at so many layers – families, political elite, economy 
– that the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon between 1976 and 2005 does not 
qualify as an occupation.216 The situation resembled that of the USSR protectorates 
in central European countries. The flexibility of Syrian policies expresses the 
exceptional Machiavellian political skills of President Hafiz al-Asad, who 
understood the weakness, insecurities, likes, and dislikes of his Lebanese 
collaborators and rivals and turned this know-how into a political instrument.217  
 The creation of common interests in North Lebanon explained why, even after 
the Syrian withdrawal, many Sunni elites remained close to Syrian decision 
makers. The exclusion of the Sunni urban poor from the same networks and the 
repressive Syrian policies vis-à-vis Sunni poor quarters in Tripoli, explained why 
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